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I.

INTRODUCTION

On April 16, 2013, Coach Beth Burns was the head coach of the women’s
basketball team at San Diego State University.1 Her team had just finished up a
record-setting season, and she “had just been named Mountain West Conference
Coach of the Year, WBCA NCAA Division I Region 7 Coach of the Year, and a
finalist for NCAA Division I National Coach of the Year.”2 She had served as
head coach continually since 2005, having been hired back to the position she
previously held from 1989-1997.3 Burns was one year into a five-year contract
renewal at a $220,000 annual base salary with opportunities for additional
compensation based on merit.4
When she arrived at her athletic director’s office that day, for what she
believed to be her annual performance review, she had no idea that it would be
her last day on the job.5 Burns later describes being shocked and blindsided by
athletic director Jim Sterk’s real purpose for the meeting: to present Burns with
three options: “resign, retire, or be fired.”6 She was equally shocked by the
* Professor, Western New England University School of Law.
1
Complaint at 3, Burns v. San Diego State Univ. et al., No. 37-2014-00003408-CU-CO-CTL (Cal.
Super. Ct. filed Feb. 19, 2014).
2
Id. at 6.
3
Id. at 3.
4
Id. at 4.
5
Id. at 2.
6
Id.
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reason Sterk presented.
Sterk presented that Burns had purportedly “struck a subordinate”—her
assistant coach Adam Barrett.7 A video that was slid under Sterk’s door shows
Burns and Barrett seated next to each other at a bench on the sideline.8 At two
different points during the game, Burns made contact with Barrett, bringing her
hand down on his clipboard and seemingly elbowing him, in moments following
baskets by the opposing team.9 Burns would later describe the video as showing
“insignificant” and harmless contact made in the heat of the game and coaching
the team.10 Even Barrett did not perceive the contact to be malicious in any
way.11 Nevertheless, the video served as the university’s official rationale for
terminating a successful coach “for cause” in the middle of her contract.12 Sterk
claimed it was part of a pattern of aggression towards her coaching staff,
notwithstanding Burns’s record of positive performance evaluations and
commendations from university officials. 13
Blindsided is also how some described the firing of successful University
of Iowa head field hockey coach Tracey Griesbaum.14 When she was asked to
meet with athletic director Gary Barta on August 4, 2014, the fourteen-year
veteran head coach knew that the department had received an anonymous
complaint that Griesbaum intimidated and verbally abused her players.15 But a
university investigation cleared her of wrongdoing and she had discussed with her
boss her plans for moving forward.16 Days later, however, Barta informed
Griesbaum that she was fired at the start of her season and in the middle of her
contract.17
Though the timing of the decision could have seemed shocking since it
was so soon after the seemingly favorable resolution of the anonymous complaint,
it may not have been so surprising to anyone following the trend at Iowa.18 In the
time period of Barta’s employment, the athletic department “pushed out or fired”

7

Id. at 2.
Mark Zeigler, Former SDSU AD Sterk Takes Stand in Burns Trial, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB.
(Sep. 13, 2016), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sports/aztecs/sdut-sdsu-beth-burns-trialjim-sterk-2016sep13-story.html.
9
The video is posted here. Mark Zeigler, Burns’ Lawsuit v. SDSU Finally Goes to Trial, SAN
DIEGO TRIB. (Aug. 27, 2016), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sports/sdut-sdsu-beth-burnswrongful-termination-trial-begins-2016aug27-story.html.
10
Burns, No. 37-2014-00003408-CU-CO-CTL, at 7.
11
Zeigler, supra note 8.
12
Burns, No. 37-2014-00003408-CU-CO-CTL, at 7.
13
Zeigler, supra note 8.
14
Annie Brown, A Man’s Game: Inside the Inequality that Plagues Women’s College Sports,
REVEAL NEWS (May 5, 2016), https://www.revealnews.org/article/a-mans-game-inside-theinequality-that-plagues-womens-college-sports/.
15
Complaint at 15, Griesbaum v. The Univ. of Iowa et al. (Dist. Ct. Iowa filed Feb. 29, 2016); see
also Brown, supra note 14. Though the accessible version of Griesbaum’s complaint lacks a
registered “CL” number, the action is available here:
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2800035/Tracey-Griesbaum-Filing.pdf
16
Brown, supra note 14.
17
Id.
18
Id.
8
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six female coaches and the highest-level female administrator.19 The athletic
department provided various explanations for the fate of all these female coaches,
including player complaints, like in Griesbaum’s case, or failure to produce
enough wins.20
However, some attribute the lack of competitive success to the
department’s failure to support the women’s teams with adequate resources, and
also point out that neither complaints against male coaches nor their success
records were scrutinized similarly.21 Some of these female coaches were replaced
with male coaches who were paid significantly higher salaries than their
predecessors, and when female coaches were replaced by other women, those
women were paid less.22 In this context, Griesbaum’s termination, unfortunately,
may be not so “shocking” after all.
Shannon Miller’s women’s hockey team at the University of MinnesotaDuluth (“UMD”) was in the middle of a winning streak and had a national
ranking when athletic director Josh Berlo called her to a meeting on December 9,
2014.23 There, Miller learned from Berlo that her employment contract would not
be renewed at the end of the season in June, nor would the contracts of any of the
women’s hockey staff.24 Berlo’s explanation was that “the decision was ‘strictly
financial’” and that the university could not afford to retain one of the most
successful coaches in hockey.25
This surprised Miller, because prior to this time, Berlo had not indicated to
Miller that he was not considering nonrenewal,26 nor had he raised ahead of time
the possibility of alternative ways to address the financial situation, such as a
salary reduction.27 Miller reported that if one had been offered, she would have
taken a salary reduction to save her job, as she had during hard times in the past.28
The media also found Berlo’s explanation surprising. One reporter
pointed out that after replacing Miller with another coach, the university would
only save “maybe $65,000.”29 Miller already earned less than her men’s team
counterpart, and ran her successful program on a smaller operating budget30—
facts that further obscured the foreseeability of Berlo’s “strictly financial”
19

Griesbaum, at 9; see also Brown, supra note 14.
Griesbaum, at 10-14.
21
Id. at 6-7.
22
Id. at 12-14.
23
Complaint at 5, Miller et al. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Minn., No. 0:15-cv-03740-RHKLIB, (D. Minn. filed Sept. 28, 2015).
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 6.
27
Id. at 5-6.
28
Kate Fagan, Minnesota-Duluth Doesn’t Want Wildly Successful Hockey Coach . . . Wait, What?,
ESPNW (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.espn.com/espnw/newscommentary/article/12046227/minnesota-duluth-want-wildly-successful-hockey-coach-wait-what.
29
Id.
30
Id. (“Miller will make approximately $215,000 this season. Yes, she is the highest paid
women's college hockey coach in the country [and deservedly so], but her base salary is still
$20,000 less than UMD men's coach Scott Sandelin. Also, the operating budget for women's
hockey was already about $275,000 less than that of the men's program.”). Id.
20
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decision. Along with two other female UMD coaches who left or were forced out
around the same time as Miller, Miller claims that the athletic department was a
hostile working environment for female coaches, especially those, like Miller and
her colleagues, who are gay.31
These three cases serve as examples of some of the ways that sex
discrimination operates in the working environment of college athletics. These
coaches are not alone. A recent study found that forty percent of female college
coaches believe they have experienced sex discrimination in the workplace.32
Thirty-three percent believe that they do not have the freedom to ask their
departments to address gender bias without being punished for doing so.33
Female coaches were twice as likely as male coaches to perceive that their
“performance was evaluated differently because of gender (15% versus 6%).”34
It is likely that employment discrimination is a contributing factor to the
significant gender gap in the ranks of college athletics’ career professionals,
where women are outnumbered at every rung of the leadership ladder, from
assistant coach to head coach to administrator to athletic director.35 The dearth
and decline of women among the ranks of college coaches is particularly notable
in contrast to rising number of opportunities women have in virtually every other
profession.36 Advocates and scholars are trying to understand and address the
reasons behind women’s absence in college coaching. They are doing so not only
to help women who are or aspire to be coaches or who hold other positions of
leadership, but because the presence of female leadership in the highly visible and
consumed context of sport has tremendous power to mitigate the gender
stereotypes that undermine women’s access to leadership in the political,
business, and other contexts as well.37
31

Complaint at 20-22, 37-38, Miller et al. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Minn., No. 0:15-cv03740-RHK-LIB, (D. Minn. filed Sept. 28, 2015).
32
WOMEN’S SPORTS FOUNDATION, BEYOND X’S & O’S: GENDER BIAS AND COACHES OF WOMEN’S
COLLEGE SPORTS 2 (2016), https://www.womenssportsfoundation.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/08/beyond-xs-osfinal-for-web.pdf. For other, earlier examples of alleged
discrimination against female coaches, see generally Erin Buzuvis, Sidelined: Title IX Retaliation
Cases and Women’s Leadership in College Athletics, 17 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1 (2010).
33
Id. (The report also concluded that, “Overall, 31% of female coaches and 20% of male coaches
in this study believed that they would ‘risk their job’ if they spoke up about Title IX and gender
equity. LGBTQ female coaches were the most apt to fear raising concerns about Title IX and
gender equity, with 34% believing they would risk their jobs if they spoke up.”) Id. at 3.
34
Id. at 2.
35
Vivian Acosta & Linda J. Carpenter, Women in Intercollegiate Sport: A Longitudinal Study
Thirty-Seven Year Update A-C (2014), acostacarpenter.org. According to most recent data,
women occupy 43.4 % of head coach positions in women’s sport, and 2 to 3.5% of head coach
positions in men’s sports. Id. at A (“Only 22.3 percent of athletic directors are female.”). Id. at B
(“11.3% of athletics departments have NO female anywhere in the administration.”). Id. at C.
36
NICOLE M. LAVOI, A FRAMEWORK TO UNDERSTAND EXPERIENCES OF WOMEN COACHES
AROUND THE GLOBE, IN WOMEN IN SPORTS COACHING (LaVoi, ed. 2016).
37
LAVOI, supra note 36; see Erin Buzuvis, Barriers to Leadership in Women’s College Athletics,
in INTRODUCTION TO INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS 272 (Eddie Comeaux ed., 2015); see also
Pamela Bass, Second Generation Gender Bias in College Coaching: Can the Law Reach That
Far?, 26 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 671, 672 (2016) (“The more women see other women in these
[leadership] roles [in sports and elsewhere], the more they can aspire to be like them and have
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There are many reasons that contribute to the absence of female coaches.38
One common explanation is that coaching jobs may be particularly incompatible
with family and childcare responsibilities that disproportionately fall to women.39
This argument is often presented as a defense of the status quo, since universities
themselves did not cause, and are not obligated to solve, social inequities external
to athletics.40 Relatedly, many point to women themselves as the cause of the
decline and dearth of female coaches by choosing to prioritize family over a
career. Still, however, such choices are modulated by socially constructed gender
roles, which women internalize as well as men. Admittedly, it is difficult to apply
legal remedies to address gender inequality within the family, and to challenge the
role of social expectations about women’s role in the family on their otherwise
agentic decisions to pursue careers that are more conducive to that role.
Yet there is obviously much more to the explanation for the lack of female
coaches than the role of family responsibilities. Stories like those of Burns,
Griesbaum, and Miller—none of which involved a conflict between coaching and
family responsibility—demonstrate other explanations for the departure of women
from coaching as well. These stories, most likely, also deter current and potential
coaches from pursuing leadership positions in women’s sport. These cases, along
with others that are similar, demonstrate how female coaches and athletic
administrators (or women who aspire to those positions) are uniquely vulnerable
to biases, implicit or otherwise, that result from the cultural association between
masculinity and characteristics like leadership and competency as a male.41 This
not only holds back women in women’s sport, but makes it difficult to impossible
for female coaches to cross over into coaching men.42 As a result, nearly all
female coaches are additionally vulnerable to the bias that comes from working
with female athletes, whose athletic endeavors are taken less seriously by athletic
departments.
Though many male coaches of women’s teams also experience this form
of bias, female coaches additionally experience bias because of their own sex.
Additionally, intersections of these gender stereotypes with stereotypes about
women of color, about lesbians, and about aging may explain why lesbians and

female role models. In addition, the more men and women see women in these roles, the more
they can eliminate equating leadership exclusively with men.”).
38
See LAVOI, supra note 36; Buzuvis, supra note 37, at 278-81.
39
See Pat Borzimarch, Number of Women Coaching in College Hockey Dwindling, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 17, 2012), http://www nytimes.com/2012/03/18/sports/in-college-hockey-female-coachesoften-skate-away-from-demands-of-the-job html; see also Dana H. Benbow, Why has Number of
Women Coaches Fallen since Title IX?, USA TODAY (Feb. 23, 2015),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2015/02/23/women-college-coaches-title-9ix/23917353/.
40
Id.
41
See supra notes 1, 23, and 35 (showing the cultural associations between masculinity,
leadership, and competency).
42
See Shane Miller, Tear Down This Wall: Why Men's College Sports Need More Female
Coaches, 22 SPORTS L.J. 127, 129 (2015).
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successful veteran coaches are so often targeted43 for termination and why women
of color are particularly underrepresented.44
Additionally, the stories of Burns, Miller, and Griesbaum also illustrate
the potential for legal challenges aimed at evoking damages, institutional change,
and public exposure. In all three cases, the coaches involved insisted that their
terminations resulted from gender bias, and in Miller’s case, intersecting sexual
orientation and age discrimination. All three of them sued their universities:
Burns’s case went to trial in September 2016, and a jury found in her favor and
awarded her $3.35 million in damages;45 Miller sued the University of MinnesotaDuluth along with two co-plaintiffs, fellow coaches, who also allege to be victims
of athletic department’s sexism;46 and Griesbaum’s lawsuit against Iowa is still
pending,47 as are the other two. This Article provides a brief overview of legal
protections that are most relevant in these and similar cases. It uses the three
cases described above as examples to illustrate four of the most notorious aspects
of sex discrimination in college athletics employment: double standards,
retaliation, discrimination in compensation, and intersectionality. It explains how
each of these may be challenged using various federal and state law.
II.

OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT DISCRIMINATION LAW

This section provides a brief overview of the law that is most relevant to
employment discrimination claims by female coaches and athletic administrators.
A.

Disparate Treatment Claims Under Title VII and Title IX

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196448 is a federal law that prohibits
employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of sex, as well as
race, national origin, and religion. Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of
1972 prohibits sex discrimination by educational institutions that accept federal
funds.49 Both statutes permit individuals to sue for disparate treatment on the
43

NICOLE M. LAVOI, A FRAMEWORK TO UNDERSTAND EXPERIENCES OF WOMEN COACHES
AROUND THE GLOBE, in WOMEN IN SPORTS COACHING (LaVoi, ed. 2016) (explaining that lesbian
and veteran coaches are targeted).
44
Buzuvis, supra note 37, at 277 (showing that women of color particularly underrepresented).
45
Mark Ziegler, Judge Tentatively Upholds Burns Verdict, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB. (Dec. 1,
2016), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sports/aztecs/sd-sp-burnstrial-20161201-story html.
46
See Miller et al. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Minn., No. 0:15-cv-03740-RHK-LIB, (D.
Minn. filed Sept. 28, 2015).
47
Griesbaum v. The Univ. of Iowa et al. (Dist. Ct. Iowa filed Feb. 29, 2016). Just prior to this
article going to press, the University of Iowa agreed to pay a total of $6.5 million to settle both the
lawsuit of Coach Griesbaum as well as separate litigation filed by Griesbaum's partner, former
Iowa associate athletic director Jane Meyer. Coach Griesbaum's share of settlement is reportedly
$1.5 million. Erin Jordan, University Pays $6.5 Million in Meyer, Griesbaum Case, The Gazette
(May 19, 2017), http://www.thegazette.com/subject/news/higher-education/university-of-iowapays-6-million-in-meyer-griesbaum-cases-20170519.
48
42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-2(a).
49
20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
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basis of sex.50 Some federal courts have held that plaintiffs may not use Title IX
in cases where Title VII is available,51 thus foreclosing Title IX’s application to
cases challenging sex discrimination by an educational-institution employer. But
where Title IX is available, it offers a few advantages over Title VII. Title IX
imposes no cap on compensatory damages, while Title VII limits such relief to
$300,000 in most cases.52 Additionally, Title IX does not require a plaintiff to
exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit. In contrast, a Title VII plaintiff
must first file a complaint with the EEOC or equivalent state agency and get the
agency’s approval to sue. The deadline for filing such an administrative
complaint under Title VII is much sooner than for filing a lawsuit under Title IX,
which may also pose an obstacle for some plaintiffs.
B.

Administrative Complaints

Discrimination that violates Title IX may also be challenged by filing an
administrative complaint with the Department of Education’s Office for Civil
Rights, instead of, or in addition to a lawsuit. As an example of a lawsuit with a
parallel administrative complaint, Miller and others have filed an administrative
complaint about the University of Minnesota-Duluth since initiating a lawsuit
against the institution in federal court.53 Because there are no requirements that
the complainants have standing—that is, personally experience the discrimination
that they allege—the administrative complaint is more likely than the lawsuit to
force UMD to reconcile with the argument that the institution violated students’
rights under Title IX when they replaced a women’s team’s successful and
experienced coach with someone less credentialed and less expensive.54
Similarly, athletes at Iowa filed a complaint with OCR alleging that Griesbaum’s

50

See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 709 (1979); Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub.
Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992).
51
See e.g., Lakoski v. James, 66 F.3d 751, 753 (5th Cir. 1995); Waid v. Merrill Area Pub. Sch., 91
F.3d 857, 861–62 (7th Cir. 1996).
52
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3). Title VII on the other hand is a more reliable statute for pursuing
punitive damages, which many courts have found to be unavailable under Title IX. See, e.g.,
Mercer v. Duke Univ., 50 F. App’x 643 (4th Cir. 2002); Lalowski v. Corinthian Sch., Inc. et al.,
No. 10 C 1928, 2012 WL 245203, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 26, 2012). But see Katrina Pohlman, Have
We Forgotten K-12? The Need for Punitive Damages to Improve Title IX Enforcement, 71 U. PITT.
L. REV. 167, 168 (2009) (arguing that courts have erred in interpreting Title IX to foreclose
punitive damages).
53
Complaint at 1-12, Kolls et al. v. Univ. of Minn. Duluth, (filed Nov. 30, 2015).
54
Id. at 3. Title IX requires universities to provide equal treatment to its men’s and women’s
athletic programs. Regulations that delineate the factors in which equal treatment is evaluated
include “opportunity to receive coaching” and “assignment and compensation of coaches” 34
C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(5)-(6). According to OCR, a compensation disparity constitutes unequal
treatment if it “den[ies] male and female athletes coaching of equivalent quality, nature, or
availability.” Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 44 Fed. Reg. 71413, 71416 (Dec.
11, 1979).
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termination deprives them the opportunity to receive coaching.55
If OCR determines that the complaint alleges facts that, if true, would
constitute violations of Title IX, it will investigate the complaint. The agency’s
investigation may generate findings that support the allegations of the complaint,
which will theoretically trigger the process for withholding the institution’s
federal funding. The threat of withholding invariably motivates institutions to
reach a resolution with the agency instead. A resolution agreement typically
requires the institution to correct the Title IX violations that OCR has found and
to commit to the agency’s monitoring and oversight for several years to ensure
that those corrections occur.
C.

Retaliation

Title IX and Title VII both prohibit employers from retaliating against
employees who complain about or challenge sex discrimination. Title VII’s
antiretaliation provision protects an employee who opposes unlawful employment
discrimination,56 while Title IX protects an even broader range of whistleblower
conduct. In 2005, the Supreme Court held that Title IX’s general ban on sex
discrimination included retaliation against a high school girls’ basketball coach
who had complained about the inferior treatment of his team.57 By ruling in the
coach’s favor, the Court confirmed Title IX retaliation plaintiffs need not have
personally been affected by the discrimination they were punished for having
challenged so long as the complained-of discrimination is covered by Title IX.58
Thus, Title IX protects coaches and administrators from retaliation when they
object to sex discrimination affecting matters related to their own employment,
such as compensation or working conditions, as well as sex discrimination
affecting athletes.59 Additionally, many states have laws that, like Title VII,
prohibit employers from retaliating against employees who oppose unlawful
employment practices or unlawful practices in general.60

55

Complaint at 1-27, Ackers et al. v. Univ. of Iowa, (filed Jan. 28, 2015), available at
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2800034/Office-of-Civil-Rights-Complaint-ofStudent.tx.
56
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
to discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this
subchapter.”) Id. Both references to “this subchapter” delineate the scope of Title VII’s
retaliation provision as being limited to violations of Title VII itself.
57
See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005).
58
Id.
59
As noted earlier, some courts insist that where both statutes apply, Title VII provides the
exclusive remedy. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. But since Title VII does not apply to
retaliation based on non-employment related discrimination, Title IX is always available to
coaches who were punished for complaining about sex discrimination affecting athletes. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012).
60
See, e.g., National Conference of State Legislatures, State Whistleblower Laws, 1, 1-4 (2010),
http://www ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/state-whistleblower-laws.aspx.
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State Laws

Many states have employment discrimination laws that provide identical
or stronger protection for plaintiffs who have experienced adverse employment
action motivated by discrimination. In all three of the cases described in the
article, the plaintiffs utilized state laws instead of, or in addition to, Title IX and
Title VII: Griesbaum and Burns sued their employers under the Iowa Civil Rights
Act and the California Fair Employment and Fair Housing Act respectively, in
lieu of raising claims under federal law; while Miller utilized a combination of the
Minnesota Human Rights Act, Title IX, and Title VII.61 It may be advantageous
in some cases to rely on, or at least include, federal law claims even where those
laws do not provide any additional protection beyond what is available under state
law.62
Specifically, including a federal claim provides the plaintiff with the
opportunity to file suit in federal court. Federal courts’ jurisdictions cover larger
geographic areas and contain more potential jurors than a local state court
jurisdiction. Filing suit in federal court could therefore be strategic in cases where
the local jury pool is likely to have alumni or employment ties to the university
defendant and possibly be biased in favor of its athletic department.63
Conversely, state law claims are more advantageous than Title IX and/or Title VII
in some cases. For example, California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act has
no cap on damages,64 while Title VII caps punitive and compensatory damages.65
As noted earlier, Title IX does not cap compensatory damages, but it may not be
available in jurisdictions that consider Title VII the exclusive remedy for sex
discrimination in the academic workplace.66 Also, Title IX appears to limit
punitive damages.
E.

Equal Pay Act

The Equal Pay Act is federal law that requires employers to provide what
61

See supra notes 1, 15, 23 and accompanying text.
A case with a federal law claim may always be filed in federal court. The federal court will then
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over additional state claims the lawsuit also raises. If the
lawsuit does not include a federal claim, it may only be filed in federal court if the plaintiff and
defendant are from different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28
U.S.C.A. § 1332.
63
Since Minnesota state law provides at least as much employment discrimination protection as
Title IX and Title VII, it seems likely that Miller’s lawsuit included federal claims along with state
law claims for this reason. Minnesota has only one federal district court, so any potential jury
could include residents from anywhere in the state. However, it is possible to file in state court and
still avoid filing in the university’s local jurisdiction. For example, Griesbaum’s lawsuit—though
in state court—was filed in Polk County where the Board of Regents is headquartered, rather than
Johnson County, where the University of Iowa is located. Other plaintiffs, however, might not
have the opportunity to file suit in a non-local state court venue and might view federal court as
their only opportunity to mitigate the risk of juror bias.
64
See 2 DAVID SAUNDERS, CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY’S GUIDE TO DAMAGES § 3.105 (2016).
65
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3).
66
Supra note 53.
62
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in summary amounts to equal pay for equal work.67 To prevail on an Equal Pay
Act claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that another employee of the opposite sex
was paid more than someone doing a job requiring “equal skill, effort, and
responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions” – in
other words, jobs that are “substantially equal.”68 The employer can counter this
showing by establishing valid, nondiscriminatory reasons for any such disparity,
such as seniority or merit, unless these reasons are a demonstrable pretext.69
Relatedly, Title VII also permits challenges to disparate treatment in the terms
and conditions of employment, which includes compensation. Unlike the Equal
Pay Act, Title VII does not require a plaintiff to prove that she is paid less than a
male employee doing equal work if there is other evidence that the plaintiff’s
compensation was influenced by discriminatory factors.70
F.

Antidiscrimination Law and Intersectionality

U.S. civil rights law takes a categorical approach to discrimination.
Statutes that prohibit discrimination in employment, education, and other contexts
either prohibit discrimination because of a specific characteristic, such as sex
under Title IX,71 or age under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,72 or an
enumerated list of characteristics, such as Title VII’s focus on race, sex, religion,
and national origin.73 When two or more types of discrimination occur
simultaneously, plaintiffs may challenge each ground individually. For example,
it may be the case that an employer treats Black employees unfavorably compared
to White employees, and that it treats female employees unfavorably compared to
male employees. In such a case, a Black female plaintiff who experiences
discrimination can challenge both grounds by including multiple, separate counts
of discrimination in her complaint.74
67

The Equal Pay Act provides in relevant part: “No employer having employees subject to any
provisions of this section shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees
are employed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees ... at a rate
less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment
for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility,
and which are performed under similar working conditions.” 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).
68
Id.
69
For example, if the defendant claims to pay the comparator more because of some credential
that is not otherwise a factor in setting compensation for members of the plaintiff’s sex who have
that credential, that claim may appear to be a pretext.
70
For this reason, unlike the EPA, Title VII is a potential source of recourse for paying male
coaches less because they work in women’s athletics. See Morris v. Fordham Univ., No. 03 CIV.
0556 (CBM), 2004 WL 906248, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2004) (dismissing Equal Pay Act
claim of male coach of women’s basketball team who attempted to compare his salary to the coach
of men’s basketball team).
71
20 U.S.C. 1681(a).
72
29 U.S.C. § 621.
73
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
74
In theory, filing multiple claims enhances the plaintiff’s chances of winning, or at least,
surviving motions to dismiss on the pleadings or summary judgment. However, there is reason to
believe that complaints alleging multiple separate counts of discrimination fare worse than those
who litigate based on a single theory. Minna J. Kotkin, Diversity and Discrimination: A Look at
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Antidiscrimination protection is less effective, however, at challenging
discrimination that is only apparent when two or more categories are combined.75
Sex discrimination will be difficult to prove if the employer generally extends
equal treatment to women, except for those who are Black. Race discrimination
will be difficult to prove if the employer generally treats Black employees
equally, unless they are women. Because antidiscrimination laws do not
expressly permit challenges to discrimination based on the combination of
separate categories, plaintiffs whose claims are exclusively intersectional have
fewer opportunities for legal recourse.
When discrimination based on sexual orientation intersects with sex
discrimination, plaintiffs may face the additional obstacle that is the absence of
any federal law that expressly prohibits discrimination on basis of sexual
orientation as such. Unless they are litigating in one of the twenty-one states that
have such protection enumerated under state law,76 their only recourse is to
challenge it as sex discrimination under Title VII or Title IX. This works
reasonably well for some sexual orientation discrimination that coincides with
discrimination on the basis of gender nonconforming appearance and behavior,
which courts have generally come to accept as an aspect of sex discrimination.77
However, most courts, with some exception,78 consider the mere fact of
someone’s homosexuality to be outside the realm of actionable sex
discrimination.79 Thus, the many gay and lesbian employees who conform to
stereotypes in their appearance and behavior, perhaps in an effort to avoid

Complex Bias, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1439, 1457-59 (2009) (“This may occur because the
multiple claimants present a paradox in that without a doctrinal structure from which to analyze
complaints of this sort, judges seem to treat them as the child who cried wolf.”). Id. at 1458.
75
Rachel Kahn Best et al., Multiple Disadvantages: An Empirical Test of Intersectionality Theory
in EEO Litigation, 45 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 991, 1017 (2011) (concluding after empirical research
that “antidiscrimination law provides less protection in cases that involve intersecting bases of
discrimination”). Id.
76
ACLU, Non-Discrimination Laws: State by State Information-Map,
https://www.aclu.org/map/non-discrimination-laws-state-state-information-map (last visited Apr.
5, 2017).
77
See Equal Emp’t. Opportunity Comm’n. v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., L.L.C., 731 F.3d 444 (5th
Cir. 2013); Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285 (3rd Cir. 2009); Smith v. City of
Salem, Ohio, 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004); Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enter., Inc., 256 F.3d 864 (9th
Cir. 2001); Schmedding v. Tnemec Co., Inc., 187 F.3d 862 (8th Cir. 1999).
78
See Videckis v. Pepperdine Univ., 150 F. Supp.3d 1151 (C.D. Cal. 2015); Centola v. Potter, 183
F. Supp.2d 403, 410 (D. Mass. 2002) (“Sexual orientation harassment is often, if not always,
motivated by a desire to enforce heterosexually defined gender norms.”). Id. The EEOC also
adopts this theory. Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *10,
(EEOC July 16, 2015) (holding that “allegations of discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation [necessarily] state a claim of discrimination on the basis of sex”).
79
See DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., Inc., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979); Vickers v. Fairfield
Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757 (6th Cir. 2006) (rejecting gay plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim because
he “failed to allege that he did not conform to traditional gender stereotypes at work”); see also
Erin Buzuvis, A Reasonable Belief: In Support of LGBT Plaintiffs' Title VII Retaliation Claims, 91
DEN. U. L. REV. 929, 935 (2014).
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discrimination80, face a considerable barrier to successfully challenging sexual
orientation-related discrimination under federal law.
III.

DOUBLE STANDARDS AS DISPARATE TREATMENT

Each of the three cases profiled in this Article challenge some way in
which female coaches are held to a different standard than their male
counterparts. First, Miller’s case illustrates a double standard about the value of
female coaches; namely, that their success is not as highly valued as the success
of their male coaches. When UMD athletic director Berlo told Miller that they
could not afford to keep her, he was arguably imposing a penalty on Miller for her
success—a penalty that is virtually unheard of in men’s sport.81 Athletic
departments expect coaches to have winning seasons and win championships. A
coach that is successful by these measures is therefore more marketable, and more
costly to hire or retain. It is not uncommon in men’s sports like football and
basketball to be hired away from competitors at million-dollar salaries. In thirtynine states, the highest paid state employee is a football or men’s basketball
coach.82
Yet, as Miller’s case illustrates, female coaches are uniquely subject to the
possibility that they may lose their job for being too successful, since her salary
reflected the market value of her successful record and vast experience. Miller’s
complaint illustrates the double standard within the University of MinnesotaDuluth by pointing out the pay disparity between her and her male counterpart,
the men’s hockey team head coach Scott Sandelin. Sandelin’s annual salary was
over $93,000 higher than Miller’s, despite Sandelin having a lower career
winning percentage (.506 compared to Miller’s .707) and fewer national
championships (one to Miller’s five).83 Yet it was Miller, not Sandelin, who the
university fired for costing too much, even though Sandelin cost the university
more, and he produced fewer wins and championships despite receiving a higher
operating and recruiting budget.84
UMD’s rationale also implies an additional double standard in how the
athletic department values it athletes, as well as its coaches. For the athletic
80

See, e.g., Kathryn J. Schmidt, Lesbian Identity Management in Workplace Contexts: "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell” in Mainstream Organizations (2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill).
81
Rachel Blount, Minnesota Duluth Women's Hockey Coach Shannon Miller Says Dismissal
Violates Title IX, STAR TRIB. (Feb. 13, 2015),
http://www.startribune.com/sports/gophers/291785391.html.
82
Cork Gaines, The Highest Paid Public Employee in 39 US States is Either a Football or Men’s
Basketball Coach, BUS. INSIDER (Sep. 22, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/us-stateshighest-paid-public-employee-college-coach-2016-9.
83
Complaint at 7, Miller et al. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Minn., No. 0:15-cv-03740-RHKLIB, (D. Minn. filed Sept. 28, 2015).
84
Id. at 7. Miller alleged that she was told Sandelin had an unlimited budget for recruiting, while
hers was $26,000. The men’s team operating budget exceeded that of the women’s team by
$273,590, despite only having three more players. The men’s team received more coaching and
management staff, more academic support, and even more meals. Id. at 7-9.
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department to achieve its objective of saving money for the university, it would
have to replace Miller with a new coach who is considerably less expensive.85
Since pay is commensurate with merit, this rationale confirms the university’s
intent to scale back the quality of coaching made available to female athletes.
Indeed, Miller’s replacement, an assistant coach much earlier in her career than
Miller, had no head coach experience and far less experience overall.86 It is
impossible to find an example at Minnesota-Duluth or elsewhere of a men’s team
whose successful veteran coach was fired specifically so the university could hire
someone, instead, with less experience.
Burns’s and Griesbaum’s cases illustrate a different and perhaps more
common double standard in college athletics employment: athletic directors
expect the male coaches of men’s sports to be aggressive and even tolerate their
abusive behavior in the pursuit of wins and championships, but they are quick to
label aggression in female coaches as abusive and to hold this against them. For
example, Griesbaum had a reputation for toughness and holding her players to a
high standard.87 She gave them tough workouts and was strict about team rules.88
The university claimed to fire Griesbaum because of an anonymous complaint
that she verbally abused players and forced them to play injured, claims that have
been disputed not only by Griesbaum but by her players, staff and colleagues, and
which an internal investigation did not substantiate.89 But it is possible that Iowa
decision makers found these claims of abuse to be plausible because of
Griesbaum’s toughness and competitive nature—characteristics that are
incompatible with expectations of both the coach’s and her players’ femininity.
Even if Griesbaum was truly abusive in the way that Iowa alleged, it is
difficult to imagine Iowa or any university objecting to similar behavior by a male
coach of male athletes.90 Examples like that of Mike Rice, the Rutgers men’s
basketball coach who was fired after ESPN exposed physically and verbally
abusive outbursts,91 confirm that only in cases involving public exposure and
extreme misconduct are male coaches disciplined for abusive conduct towards
male athletes. Indeed, Iowa tolerated “male coaches using foul language,
screaming at athletes, throwing objects and being ejected from games” according

85

Indeed, Berlo did hire Miller’s replacement at a “fraction” of Miller’s salary and gave her a fiveyear deal starting at $140,000 per year compared to Miller’s $210,000. Bob Collins, New UMD
Hockey Coach’s Deal Suggests Firing Really was About Money, MINN. PUB. RADIO: NEWS CUT
(Apr. 4, 2015), http://blogs mprnews.org/newscut/2015/04/new-umd-hockey-coachs-dealsuggests-firing-really-was-about-money/.
86
Id.
87
Brown, supra note 14.
88
Id.
89
See Griesbaum v. The Univ. of Iowa et al. (Dist. Ct. Iowa filed Feb. 29, 2016)
90
Though male coaches themselves do not transgress gender norms when they are tough and
aggressive, male coaches of female athletes have to contend with the stereotype that female
athletes cannot take tough coaching.
91
Brendan Prunty, Mike Rice Fired at Rutgers after Abusive Behavior on Practice Tapes Comes to
Light, STAR LEDGER (Apr. 3, 2013),
http://www nj.com/rutgersbasketball/index.ssf/2013/04/mike_rice_fired_at_rutgers_aft html. He
threw basketballs at players’ heads and used derogatory language when yelling at players. Id.
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to Griesbaum.92 Nor were any of the male coaches reprimanded, let alone
terminated, for holding a “punitive workout” so abusive that it resulted in the
hospitalization of thirteen football players.93
Burns’s case also illustrates the double standard in which female coaches
are uniquely vulnerable to accusations of abusive behavior. Burns claimed that
the video over which she was fired, which showed her “elbowing” an assistant
coach, only depicted a harmless act of passion rendered in the context of watching
the game.94 The other team had just scored, so Burns’s conduct in that moment
could have reflected frustration or anxiety about the game, understandable to any
competitive person. But to a viewer influenced by pervasive gender stereotypes,
the video may trigger concern because the coach’s behavior is a departure from
traditional expectations of what is appropriate behavior in women. Any truthful
claim95 that Burns was fired because of this moment of sideline intensity and
aggression proves that such behavior is still marked as deviant and problematic in
women.
Burns herself underscored this double standard by pointing out in her
complaint that no punishment befell a former SDSU football coach who slapped
an athlete.96 Also, at trial, the president of the university inadvertently confirmed
this double standard by attempting to equate Burns with the notoriously abusive
men’s basketball coach, Bobby Knight.97 The president made this comparison as
he was cross examined about his earlier testimony that the video was part of a
pervasive pattern of abusive behavior by Burns which he and others had been
concerned about even before the video surfaced.98
Burns’s attorney asked the president to square his claimed concern with
various praising and complementary emails he sent Burns during that same time.99
The president’s reply evoked Bobby Knight as an example of how a coach could
be praised for winning, even while his abusive behavior was well known.100 But
even the president admitted that Burns did not crack whips or throw chairs at
players as Knight was known to have done.101 The fact that Knight remained
employed notwithstanding those incidents,102 of course, underscores the sex-based
double standard that Burns had initially alleged.
As in Griesbaum’s example, it is possible that the very thing that made
Burns vulnerable to scrutiny for her behavior were the tactics that made her
92

Griesbaum, at 16.
Id. at 17.
94
See Burns, No. 37-2014-00003408-CU-CO-CTL.
95
The video was arguably pretext for other unlawful motive which was Burns’ retaliation for
gender equity, as discussed in the next subpart.
96
Burns, No. 37-2014-00003408-CU-CO-CTL, at 7-8.
97
Mark Zeigler, The Real Reason Beth Burns was Fired at SDSU, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB. (Sept.
30, 2016), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sports/aztecs/sd-sp-burns-20160929-story html.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id. (Not even video evidence of Knight choking a player was enough to get him fired. He was
eventually fired for grabbing a student’s arm in violation of the “zero tolerance” mandate the
university imposed after the choking incident.).
93
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effective as a coach. Burns’s colleague Steve Fisher, coach of SDSU’s men’s
basketball team, testified at her trial.103 When Burns’s attorney asked him if he
thought Burns was “hard” on assistant coaches, Fisher replied, “No. I know Beth.
She, like I, is in charge. She’s hard and demanding. I think if you’re a good
coach, you have a presence about you that permeates throughout your program.
You want things done. You want things done the right way.”104 Fisher’s
testimony supports the idea that being “hard” and “demanding” to your staff are
attributes of being a good coach; it is how you get things done. Yet for Burns and
other female coaches, these characteristics are a liability, as well as a strength.
The double standard is also double bind.
Coaches Burns, Miller, and Griesbaum all challenged their athletic
department’s application of a double standard using some combination of Title
VII, Title IX, and their respective state law.105 These laws require plaintiffs to
prove that sex discrimination was a substantial motivating factor influencing the
university’s decision.106 But courts have also recognized that employers rarely
leave evidence of their discriminatory intent and that they will state publically that
the employee’s dismissal or other adverse action resulted from some legitimate
reason unrelated to sex. For this reason, circumstantial evidence may be
sufficient to convince a jury that sex discrimination was the employer’s
motivation.107 Evidence that undermines the employer’s stated nondiscriminatory
reason may convince the jury that discrimination was actually the reason for the
employer’s decision to terminate the plaintiff’s employment or engage in other
adverse employment action.108
In cases challenging an athletic department’s sexist double standard
applied to coaches or other department employees, the plaintiff can use the
evidence of the department’s inconsistent application of a standard to suggest that
the employer did not really take the adverse action for the reason that it claims. A
jury that does not believe the university’s stated rationale may infer that
discrimination was instead the motivating factor. Furthermore, a plaintiff may
avoid having her case dismissed by including allegations in her complaint that she
is a member of a class that is protected under the applicable antidiscrimination
law, that she was terminated (or suffered other adverse employment action) from
a position which she was qualified for, and that she was treated differently from
other employees who are not in the protected class. If these allegations are
103

Mark Ziegler, Steve Fisher Testifies in Beth Burns Trial, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., (Sept. 12,
2016), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sports/sdut-sdsu-beth-burns-trial-steve-fisher2016sep12-story html.
104
Id.
105
See generally Burns, No. 37-2014-00003408-CU-CO-CTL. Burns’ arguments about the
double standard in her case also supported her breach of contract claim because they undermined
the university’s argument that her termination was for cause. As a litigation strategy, however,
Burns’ attorneys pressed the retaliation theory, which is the claim that the jury decided in her
favor and on which it awarded damages.
106
Costa v. Desert Place, 238 F.3d 1056, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2000). Moreover, to be eligible for
monetary damages, the jury must also decide that the university would not have fired her anyway
for other, nondiscriminatory reasons. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
107
238 F.3d at 1059-60.
108
Id.
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sufficient, the employer may attempt to dispute the inference of discrimination by
submitting a nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s termination, but the
plaintiff may attempt to convince the jury that the evidence supports a conclusion
that the employer’s reason was actually pretext for discrimination.
This litigation framework is well suited to challenge double standards in
the athletic department workplace. Recently, an appellate court in Texas refused
to dismiss the case of former University of Texas track and field coach, Bev
Kearney, whom the university pressured to resign after learning of the romantic
relationship Kearney had with a student athlete ten years prior.109 The court
agreed that Kearney’s complaint alleged the necessary elements to allow her to
continue to litigation.110 As both a woman and an African American, Kearney
falls in two classes that are protected from discrimination under applicable law
(which in her case is Texas state antidiscrimination law). Her forced resignation
counts as adverse employment action that may be litigated, and her qualifications
for coaching are beyond dispute.111 More importantly, the court agreed that her
allegations in support of a double standard were sufficient, even though the
university argued that the examples Kearney provided of its tolerance for sexual
relationships between white, male coaches (as well as other university employees)
and students were sufficiently dissimilar to support a double standard claim.112
However, the court determined that even though the university may
continue to dispute the similarities as litigation continues, her allegations were
sufficient to require the university to defend itself.113 This case demonstrates that
the litigation framework for disparate treatment claims allow coaches to dispute
that the university’s stated reason, however compelling, was actually its true
motive by alleging, and eventually proving to the jury, that the athletic department
treated female coaches differently from male counterparts.
In a similar fashion, it is possible to imagine Griesbaum convincing a jury
that the University of Iowa was motivated by sex discrimination if she proves that
the athletic director was quick to believe anonymous complaints about her while
overlooking similar or more egregious assaults on athletes’ welfare by male
coaches, as Griesbaum alleges.114
Griesbaum’s case for inferring sex
discrimination would be even more compelling if she proves her claims that
current athletic director Barta routinely caves to complaints by athletes against
109

Univ. of Texas at Austin v. Kearney, No. 03-14-00500-CV, 2016 WL 2659993, at *1-*2 (Tex.
Ct. App. May 3, 2016).
110
Id. at *6.
111
Steve Almasy, Hall of Fame Track Coach Resigns after Admitting Affair with Athlete, CNN,
(Jan. 1, 2013), http://edition.cnn.com/2013/01/06/sport/texas-track-coach-resigns/. (Kearney led
Texas women’s track and field to six national championships, and she has been inducted to the
coaching hall of fame for track and field). Id.
112
Kearney, No. 03-14-00500-CV, at *6.
113
Id. (Kearney alleged that the athletic department did not discipline a football coach for having a
“one night stand” with a student-trainer, nor a male volleyball coach who married one of a his
former (female) players. She also alleged more generally a pattern of tolerance of relationships
between male faculty members and students). Id. at *5-*6.
114
See Complaint at 12-14, Griesbaum v. The Univ. of Iowa et al. (Dist. Ct. Iowa filed Feb. 29,
2016). As noted above, supra note 47, Griesbaum's lawsuit settled prior to trial as this article went
to press.
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their female coaches.115
Similarly, a jury might have a hard time believing that the University of
Minnesota-Duluth was simply trying to trim its budget when it fired Miller if it is
convinced by her evidence of a double standard.116 Miller argues that
experienced female coaches were considered expendable, while more expensive
male coaches, were retained.117 Moreover, Miller, unlike Kearney, can cast
additional doubt on the university’s stated rationale with evidence of its
implausibility. If evidence shows that the university would not have realized
meaningful savings after replacing Miller with someone, or that the university did
not attempt other more logical ways to trim costs (such as asking Miller to take a
voluntary pay cut), it may be even more likely to dismiss the university’s stated
rationale and substitute one of sex discrimination in its place.
IV.

RETALIATION FOR CHALLENGING SEX DISCRIMINATION

Athletic departments sometimes retaliate against coaches and others who
complain about sex discrimination within the department. Victims of retaliation
have included female coaches and administrators who have advocated for the
rights of themselves and their colleagues for fair pay and other equitable terms
and conditions of employment.118 They have also included female and male
coaches of women’s teams who have challenged inequitable treatment of their
athletes compared to male athletes.
Retaliation is an effective tool for maintaining inequitable conditions in
any workplace because it can weed out anyone who advocates for change, while
ensuring the silence of employees who remain. But there is also discrimination
that can and has been successfully challenged by female coaches and athletic
administrators, some of whom have won millions in jury verdicts and
settlements.119
Burns’s case is among them: a jury agreed with the evidence in support of
the retaliation claim she brought under California’s Fair Housing and
Employment law120 and awarded her a $3.3 million dollar verdict in
compensation.121 Burns challenged the university’s assertion that she was fired
because of the video, alleging that the video was just the cover story, or pretext, to
hide the university’s real reason for firing her.122 Specifically, she alleged that
115

See generally id.
Complaint at 5, Miller et al. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Minn., No. 0:15-cv-03740-RHKLIB, (D. Minn. filed Sept. 28, 2015).
117
Id. at 7.
118
Buzuvis, supra note 32, at 31.
119
Id. at 44.
120
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940(h) (West 2016).
121
Mark Zeigler, Beth Burns Wins Wrongful Termination Suit vs. SDSU, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB.,
(Sept. 28, 2016), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sports/aztecs/sd-sp-burnsverdict20160928-story.html.
122
Id. At the end of the trial, Burns’s lawyers dropped the “or” and claimed that the video was
solely pretext for retaliation. Id. This was described as a tactic meant to mitigate the possibility
116
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SDSU fired her because she regularly challenged her department’s inequitable
treatment of female athletes in relation to male athletes.123 She had to “fight for
the women’s basketball team to have clean gear and equipment, a strength coach,
and facility time during the off-season,” all benefits the men’s team enjoyed, and
she challenged other inequities as well.124
Retaliation cases are often difficult for universities to dismiss prior to trial.
A plaintiff must plead, and eventually prove, that she engaged in protected
conduct, suffered an adverse employment action, and that there is some causal
nexus between those two events.125 Protected conduct is satisfied by the coach’s
internal or external complaints about gender inequality, either about her team (for
a retaliation case under Title IX) or about the conditions of her employment (for a
Title VII or Title IX case).126 An inference of causation may be sustained on the
grounds that the two events happened in a reasonably close time frame.127
Burns’s jury considered twelve allegations of protected conduct in the
form of various complaints about gender inequality affecting her team.128 The
jury found that five of those allegations supported by the evidence, including
Burns’s allegation that she complained about the men’s basketball team receiving
a fifth set of game uniforms midway through the season while her team still
hadn’t received the travel sweats they had requested, qualified.129 The jury
concluded that this protected conduct was the sole cause for the university’s
decision to terminate her employment.130 Her $3.35 million award was calculated
based on past and future economic losses, such as lost wages and earning
potential, as well as $2 million for past and future non-economic damages, such
as pain and suffering.131
The jury’s decision on Burns’s retaliation claim illustrates how Miller’s
case could similarly proceed. As already discussed, the allegations in Miller’s
case cast doubt on UMD’s claim that she was terminated for nondiscriminatory
financial reasons. Thus, it is possible to imagine how the allegations in her case,
if proven, could establish that retaliation, in addition to (or instead of) disparate
treatment motivated the athletic director’s decision. Like Burns, Miller and her
co-plaintiffs, former softball coach Jen Banford, and former basketball coach
that the jury might hedge on damages by finding for Burns only on the breach of contract claim.
Id.
123
Id.
124
Burns, No. 37-2014-00003408-CU-CO-CTL, at 4.
125
See, e.g., Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000); Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d
1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1999).
126
Buzuvis, Sidelined, supra note 32, at 7.
127
This requirement is similar under California law, which was the basis for Burns’ lawsuit. See
Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp., 214 Cal.App.3d 590, 615 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (“The causal
link may be established by an inference derived from circumstantial evidence, ‘such as the
employer's knowledge that the [employee] engaged in protected activities and the proximity in
time between the protected action and allegedly retaliatory employment decision.’”) (quoting
Jordan v. Clark, 847 F.2d 1368, 1376 (9th Cir. 1988)).
128
Zeigler, supra note 121.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id.
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Annette Wiles, allege in their case that they were fired in retaliation for
challenging a hostile working environment, which included sexual harassment
and harassment on the basis of sexual orientation, as well as challenging
discrimination against female athletes.132
Griesbaum’s case also has a retaliation component to it, though she does not
allege that Iowa’s decision to terminate her was itself retaliatory.133 Rather, she
argues that Iowa retaliated against her for complaining internally about her
termination and her unsuccessful efforts to initiate a university investigation of
sex discrimination against coaches.134 Griesbaum alleges that the university
penalized her challenging her own termination by transferring Griesbaum’s
partner, a high level athletic department official, to a position outside the athletic
department, and later firing her.135 University officials admitted that the reason
for transferring Jane Meyer, Griesbaum’s partner, was because of her relationship
and Griesbaum’s threat of litigation.136 Though it is rare for college athletics
retaliation cases to involve reprisals against someone other than the plaintiff who
engaged in protected conduct, there is precedent from employment discrimination
cases outside athletics for the idea that a retaliation plaintiff experiences adverse
employment action when the employer takes adverse action against someone the
plaintiff cares about, such as a spouse.137
V.

DISCRIMINATORY COMPENSATION

Consistent with the general trend of pay inequity between male and female
coaches and athletic administrators,138 two of the three cases that are profiled in
this Article raise specific allegations that female athletic department employees
were paid less than their male equivalents. First, as part of Griesbaum’s
allegations of a pattern of sex discrimination in Iowa athletics, she points out that
athletic director Barta demoted the female administrator who had held the
“number two” position in the department.139 The male administrator who was
inserted as the deputy director received a salary that was $70,000 higher than that
female administrator.140 The female administrator, who is also Griesbaum’s
partner, is the same administrator who was transferred outside the department and
eventually terminated in what Griesbaum alleges was retaliation for complaining
internally about her own termination.141
132

See Complaint at 1-45, Miller et al. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Minn., No. 0:15-cv03740-RHK-LIB, (D. Minn. filed Sept. 28, 2015).
133
See Complaint, Griesbaum v. The Univ. of Iowa et al. (Dist. Ct. Iowa filed Feb. 29, 2016).
134
Id. at 1-26.
135
Id. at 21-22.
136
Complaint at 7, Meyer v. Univ. of Iowa (Dist. Ct. Iowa filed Nov. 4, 2015).
137
Thompson v. North American Stainless, 131 S. Ct. 863, 865 (2011).
138
See NICOLE M. BRACKEN, 2004–2010 NCAA GENDER EQUALITY REP. 33, 47, 61, 75, 89 (2011).
139
Griesbaum, at 19. Griesbaum alleges that this course of action violated a longstanding
agreement dating back to the merger of the men’s and women’s athletics department that a male
and female administrator would hold the two highest positions of authority in the department. Id.
at 8.
140
Id. at 9.
141
Id. at 21.
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Compared to disparate treatment and especially retaliation claims, female
coaches do not have a strong track record of success on the Equal Pay Act; a
female coach may have plenty of male counterparts who are paid more, but courts
may be reluctant to see their respective roles as “equal work” especially in cases
where the comparison is between coaches of different sports, which may obscure
the similarities in skill and effort that are required of the job.142 Even when a
female coach is arguing that her pay should be commensurate with the male coach
in the same sport, athletic departments may offer other differences between men
and women’s sports to undermine her attempt at comparison. For example,
coaches may have rosters or staff of different sizes or different levels of
responsibility. Additionally, even if the coach can establish an appropriate male
comparator, the law permits a university’s defense that different levels of
compensation are warranted by differences between the coaches’ experience
levels or qualifications.
The EEOC has attempted to clarify the scope of this defense in a guidance
document addressing the EPA’s application to coaching.143 According to the
guidance, the fact that a men’s team generates more revenue than a women’s team
is not proper justification to pay the men’s team’s male coach more than his
female counterpart if the difference in revenue production is the result of
discrimination in the allocation of resources between the men and women’s
team.144 The guidance also addresses the argument that a coach’s marketplace
value is a factor other than sex that can be used to justify paying one coach more
for work equivalent to that of his opposite-sex counterpart.145 According to the
guidance, the university employer must be able to “demonstrate that it has
assessed the marketplace value of the particular individual's job-related
characteristics.”146 Generalizations and stereotypes about the going rate of male
versus female coaches will not justify a pay discrepancy for equal work.147
For an example of how this can be challenging to female coaches in pay
discrimination cases, consider Marianne Stanley’s case against the University of
Southern California.148 Stanley, the women’s basketball coach, challenged USC’s
142

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES COMMISSION, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON SEX
DISCRIMINATION IN THE COMPENSATION OF SPORTS COACHES IN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
(1997), available at https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/coaches html. According to the EEOC’s
guidance addressing pay discrimination among colleges, it is proper to compare female and male
coaches in different sports as long as the jobs require equivalent skill, effort, and responsibility.
Id. Still, comparing different sports makes such comparison more challenging for the plaintiff to
prove because the plaintiff must neutralize the effect of sport-specific differences on that
comparison. Id.
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Id.
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Id. (“[T]he Commission will carefully analyze an asserted defense that the production of
revenue is a factor other than sex to determine whether the institution has provided
discriminatorily reduced support to a female coach to produce revenue for her team. If this is the
case, it would constitute discrimination in the terms and conditions of employment which cannot
then be used to justify a pay disparity under the EPA.”). Id.
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Id.
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Id.
147
Id.
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refusal to renew her contract at the same level of compensation as the men’s team
coach, George Raveling.149 The university argued that even though the two
coaches had the same basic responsibility in coaching the same sport, Raveling’s
job required more focus on generating revenue, and was under greater scrutiny
and pressure from the public and the media.150 Stanley argued that because those
differences themselves derive from the university’s own intentional
discrimination against women’s teams, the university should not be permitted to
rely on them to defeat her discrimination claim.151 However, the court did not
resolve whether the men’s and women’s basketball coaching jobs were equal
work under the EPA.152 Instead, it reasoned that even if the jobs were equal,
Stanley’s case should still be dismissed because Raveling’s additional years of
experience, the various honors he had received, plus the fact that he had written a
book about basketball, justified paying him more.153
If Miller prevails on her EPA case, it will be notable against the backdrop
of defeats like Stanley’s. Indeed, Miller’s case, at least on its face, appears to
present a comparison between two coaches of more similar, if not superior
qualifications than Stanley compared to Raveling. Miller started as the head
coach for women’s hockey at UMD two years before Scott Sandelin was hired to
coach the men’s team. She has a better win-loss record and more championships,
as well as experience coaching a national team. It is also unlikely that a court
following the EEOC’s guidance would accept any justification rooted in the
revenue generated by the men’s team, since the complaint alleges a demonstrable
resource disparity between the men’s and women’s program. Unless UMD can
assert some other neutral factor such as the assessed marketplace value of
Sandelin’s particular skills (complying with the EEOC policy) it would have to
defeat Miller’s attempt to compare the skill, effort, and responsibility of the two
head coaching positions by arguing that it is in some way harder to coach men’s
hockey than women’s.
Notably, a version of this approach was recently advanced by the
University of Tennessee in response to EPA claims by two female strength and
conditioning coaches who worked in women’s athletics. These coaches sued
under the Equal Pay Act (as well as Title VII) to challenge the fact that UT paid
them less than male strength and conditioning coaches who worked with male
athletes.154 The university argued that the “complexities of football” justified
paying more to male strength and conditioning coaches who work in men’s
athletics, an argument that illustrates one of the major obstacles that plaintiffs face
when challenging athletic department wage discrimination.155 Football is only
ever offered as a men’s sport and virtually all college football coaches are men.
As long as a university can argue that coaching football presents unique
149
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challenges compared to coaching women’s sports, it can offer a
nondiscriminatory explanation for paying those coaches more, as well as defeat
the comparison argument necessary to sustain an Equal Pay Act claim by female
coaches who work in women’s athletics.
Of course, it is possible for plaintiffs to focus the judge or jury’s attention
on aspects of coaching that are similar regardless of the sport in question and to
neutralize some of a university’s “football exceptionalism” defense by pointing
out that whatever extra challenges there are in coaching football, they are
absorbed by larger coaching staff.156 Nevertheless, such efforts are very fact
intensive and challenging to litigate, which may in part explain why the gender
gap in college athletics compensation persists. Notably, however, the University
of Tennessee chose not to litigate the strength and conditioning coaches’ case,
instead opting to settle with the three plaintiffs for $750,000 plus attorney fees.157
Thus, even a university attempting to use the most “exceptional” of men’s sports
may not have felt comfortable litigating the female coach’s EPA claims. An
intra-sport comparison may be even weaker.
VI.

ADDITIONAL AND INTERSECTION DISCRIMINATION

Miller’s complaint argues that sex discrimination occurred in addition to
and intersecting with other forms of discrimination, including on the basis of age,
sexual orientation, and Canadian national origin.158 She and her co-plaintiffs
allege that the environment of the UMD athletic department was hostile to
lesbians. For instance, Miller alleged that the department refused to address
harassing mail Miller had received which used language that was derogatory
towards lesbians, even though she reported these letters to human resources.159
She also complained about a co-worker who referred to her as a “dyke[.]”160
Miller had to address her concerns to the chancellor before human resources took
action, and it appeared to Miller that the eventual investigation was conducted in a
way that was not sensitive to Miller’s request to protect her from retaliatory
harassment.161
156

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES COMMISSION, supra note 142.
MJ Slaby, Athletics Department Lawsuit Settlement to Cost UT at Least $1.05M, KNOXVILLE
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Miller’s examples of sexual orientation discrimination fit into a broader
narrative of hostility towards coaches who are or perceived to be lesbian.162 Other
coaches’ legal claims have also contributed to this narrative, such as the litigation
and administrative complaints against Fresno State that revealed a pattern of
hostility towards lesbian coaches and administrators,163 or the trial of San Diego
Mesa College that involved claims of discrimination against lesbian coaches who
were in a relationship with each other.164
For various legal reasons, it is difficult to challenge sexual orientation
discrimination directly. In hostile environment cases for example, it may be
difficult to accumulate enough examples to satisfy the requirement that hostility
be “severe or pervasive,” especially when juror members lack the perspective of
lesbian coaches to recognize homophobia when it is subtle. However, there are a
number of examples of lesbian plaintiffs recovering damages or significant
settlements for retaliation claims rooted in underlying homophobia, including
both the Fresno State and San Diego Mesa plaintiffs discussed above.165
Retaliation law does not require the plaintiff to prove that conduct they
complained about actually violated the law, as long as they reasonably believed it
to be so. Therefore, a plaintiff like Miller could theoretically prevail on her
argument that she was retaliated against for complaining about a homophobic
hostile environment, even if she does not prevail on her claim that the hostile
environment at UMD itself constituted legally actionable sexual orientation
discrimination.
Miller and her co-plaintiffs allege discrimination because their
compensation was “less per year than their male, straight, American and/or under
40 colleagues for parallel jobs with the same level of responsibilities.”166 The
complaint also notes that UMD has not terminated or reduced compensation for
any male, straight, under 40 or American head coaches, thus raising the multiple
and intersecting aspects of discrimination at play when Berlo fired Miller for
ostensibly financial reasons.167
The added intersections of age and national origin are interesting to
consider because they are among the first public narratives of sex discrimination
in college coaching to contain these added elements. The age discrimination
element in particular may be representative of a generalizable trend in the athletic
department working environment.
Professor LaVoi suggests that age
discrimination against female coaches is a relatively common phenomenon for
various reasons.168 The veteran status of older female coaches may result in their
162
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becoming the mouthpiece for concerns about gender equity within the
department, and thus more vulnerable to reprisal. It is also likely that they are
affected by a double standard in which older female coaches are denied the
presumption of competency enhanced by experience that is extended to their
same-age male colleagues.169
VII.

CONCLUSION

The three cases profiled in this Article all add to the complex and
emerging narrative of the working conditions for women in college athletics.
Because these cases are so recent to have either been filed or tried, they
demonstrate that the already-documented dimensions of problems female coaches
face170 are still at play. Additionally, they expose some new (or less well-known)
aspects to this dynamic, such as the intersection with age discrimination, as well
as a double standard related to the value of female coaches’ success. Finally, they
demonstrate how the law continues to be leveraged to challenge barriers to
women’s leadership in college sports.
Admittedly, litigation is a tool that only directly challenges a narrow set of
factors that contribute to the overall underrepresentation of women coaches.
Discriminatory termination, compensation, and harassment serve to deter and
drive women from coaching, but sex discrimination affects women’s employment
opportunities in athletics in more ways than these. Even institutions that do not
intentionally set out to suppress female leadership may engage uncritically in
practices that have the effect of foreclosing women’s opportunities or deterring
them from pursuing leadership positions in college athletics.
For example, institutions may fill open head coach or administrator
positions based on personal relationships and without an open search—a practice
that ensures existing power structures are replicated to the exclusion of women as
well as people of color. For another example, many coaches’ and administrators’
jobs are structured in ways that make it difficult or impossible to juggle family
and domestic responsibilities that disproportionately fall on women.
It is difficult to attack these practices directly via lawsuits, for a variety of
reasons.171 But lawsuits and administrative complaints can focus public attention
on these structural problems and contribute documented examples to aid in non169
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legal advocacy. Thus, the pursuit of legal remedies is important not only because
it provides for justice and institutional accountability in individual coaches’ and
administrators’ cases, but because it contributes to the broader project of
dismantling endemic sex discrimination in college athletics employment.

